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Abstract 
This paper aims at discussing the different ways in which subjectivities are produced by 
psychological practices, with a focus on clinical practice. This research is conceptually based on 
Isabelle Stengers’ and Vinciane Despret’s Political Epistemology and Bruno Latour’s and John 
Law’s Actor-Network Theory. For these authors, scientific knowledge is produced not as a 
representation of reality through well-formed sentences, but as modes of articulation between 
researchers and investigated entities. To investigate these modes of articulation produced by clinical 
practices, we observed the modes of articulation present in specific psychological techniques with 
regard to their users, especially in a therapeutic environment. These techniques follow a wide range 
of therapeutic approaches (psychoanalysis, cognitive behavioral therapy, Gestalt therapy and 
institutional analysis) are currently being observed at the DPA (Division of Applied Psychology) at 
UFRJ (Federal University from Rio de Janeiro) through interviews and an ethnographic approach. 
Furthermore, we will discuss processes related to interns and patients. With regard to the interns, 
we observed a very complex and almost impossible mode of negotiation with respect to the practices, 
concepts and duration of therapy among the therapy groups at DPA. Their education in these 
different therapeutic approaches can be likened to a process of purification: beyond the discussion 
of some basic concepts, much of the interns’ education consists in the constant criticism of other 
approaches. It is also very rare to observe students who practice more than one approach: beyond 
the pragmatic problem in articulating very different practices, there is a constant process of critique 
between both groups to which the intern belongs. With regard to patients it was possible to perceive 
two response patterns: 1) Canonical answers about what therapy is and what its goals are, 
demonstrating docility regarding the psychologist’s authority. 2) Answers with a more inquisitive 
position about psychology, with an underlying understanding that it is a way of seeing the world, a 
philosophy of life, thus presenting a more recalcitrant position. In this case patients link therapy to 
very diverse practices, and they do so in a very active way, in a process that resembles what Foucault 
calls the techniques of the self (a group of practices and exercises used actively by someone aiming 
to transform themselves into an ethical being). We can find such techniques among patients in 
various practices, e.g. writing in diaries, the singular appropriations of the discourse of the 
therapists, and even exercises of self-questioning and problematization of the instances of collective 
life, such as prejudice, stereotypes and subliminal messages. Thus, we can define patients in various 
ways, but not as passive and patient creatures. 
 
 




This paper aims at discussing the different ways in which subjectivities are produced by 
psychological practices, with a focus on clinical practice. This research is conceptually 
based on Isabelle Stengers’ and Vinciane Despret’s Political Epistemology (PE) and Bruno 
Latour’s, Annemarie Mol’s and John Law’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT). To explain how 
these concepts are used in clinical practice, we will first clarify their viewpoints on 
knowledge, the production of objectivity and subjectivity, and the unity (or plurality) of 
knowledge. For these authors, scientific knowledge is produced not as a representation of 
reality through well-formed sentences, but as modes of articulation between researchers and 
the investigated entities. In order to examine and obtain an empirical understanding of these 
modes of articulation that are produced by psychological theory and practice (through the 
lens of ANT and PE), we observed the modes of articulation between different actors 
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(human and non-human) that are present in the application of certain psychological 
techniques, especially during therapy. In particular, we are currently observing techniques 
that follow different approaches (psychoanalysis, cognitive behavioral therapy, gestalt 
therapy and institutional analysis) at the DAP (Division of Applied Psychology) at UFRJ 
(Federal University of Rio de Janeiro). This DAP offers psychotherapeutic services to the 
community as a low-cost (or even free) service and employs student interns as therapists, 
who are instructed by a professor or a psychologist of the Institute of Psychology from this 
university. Our research project is carried out through two main methods: on the one hand, 
through semi-structured interviews with patients (recently admitted and longtime), interns, 
supervisors and screening personnel (see Appendix); on the other, through an ethnographic 
approach in which researchers take part in the supervision sessions of various teams that 
follow different psychotherapeutic approaches. Then we will discuss the processes 
concerning the diversity (plurality, multiplicity or unity) of the field in relation to the student 
interns and patients. In conclusion we will establish a comparison between the perspectives 
of ANT & PE and epistemology, besides offering an empirical reflection about the central 
concepts of these perspectives. 
The production of worlds, subjects and modes of research 
The vast majority of therapeutic practices in psychology seek to differentiate themselves 
from other practices that are placed in the margin and outside the scientific threshold 
through the use of several mechanisms. Traditionally, these are objectifying strategies such 
as models, concepts and methods: the so-called scientific approach. However, such psi 
therapeutic approaches also possess two characteristic features: 1) the rejection of 
suggestion and influence, which could justify the success of other practices that were created 
“at the margin of science”, 2) secrecy as a dual mode of creation, both of professional 
competence and of patient demand (Despret, 2011a).  
The key assumption on the part of most supposedly scientific therapeutic practices is simply 
that influence and suggestion warrant the success of other extra-scientific practices. In this 
case, influence and suggestion become counter-explanations, which turn them into true 
placebo effects if they are compared with the “solid” results obtained by the so-called 
scientific therapies. These supposedly produce stable results based on a true representation 
of the truth that is held by the subject (or organism), with no production of artifice. It is in 
this sense that Freud (borrowing from Leonardo da Vinci) made the distinction between 
psychoanalysis and suggestive therapies. Leonardo da Vinci made the distinction between 
two modes of artistic production, per via di porre (painting) and per via di levare 
(sculpture): the first functioned by adding colors onto the canvas, while the second revealed 
a work of art that was hidden in the rough stone. For Freud (1969), the path of 
psychoanalysis is similar to that of sculpture (levare), while the suggestive therapies are 
akin to painting (porre). This distinction was supposedly present in a series of historical 
narratives in which psychological therapies had their origins or prehistory in the practices 
of witchcraft or shamanism (based on influence), which were continued or surpassed. 
However, these practices were improved inside a scientific framework (see, for instance, 
Ellenberger, 1976). 
Authors such as Vinciane Despret, Isabelle Stengers, Tobie Nathan, and Bruno Latour, 
however, propose another perspective regarding this evolution. Influence is only a problem 
from an epistemological perspective, which assumes that scientific knowledge is obtained 
through the purification of data, in which the researcher’s task is only to represent the 
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objects with properly constructed statements. On the other hand, for these authors 
knowledge is always produced by the articulation and co-affectation between entities, in the 
production of unexpected effects, and not in any representational leap. 
For Despret, scientific knowledge operates on the margins of the “misunderstanding of 
realization”, such as “that, in which events can be actualized simply because the promise 
they contain can come true” (Despret, 2002, p. 92). In this sense, a misunderstanding is not 
regarded as a parasitic influence that needs to be purified, but rather as an effective promise 
in the relationship between researchers and researched subjects involved in the production 
of knowledge. This is similar to what James (1996) named “the will to believe”. 
If scientific knowledge can no longer be distinguished in terms of good and bad 
representations, by assuming an external term of evaluation (as is postulated by traditional 
epistemologies), how can it be evaluated? The answer lies in the specific modes of 
connection between entities, in a microphysical analysis of the modes of articulation. What 
characterizes bad and good articulations? In the first case, we have a situation where the 
articulation between various entities is extorted or conditioned to obtain an expected 
response, without any risk. In the second case, we have an articulation which the testimony 
goes beyond a mere response, creating to the risk of invalidating the researcher’s own 
questions and propositions and letting the researched subjects raise new questions: in other 
words, this constitutes a recalcitrant relationship. Scientific knowledge thus does not lead 
to a reduced and uniform reality, but to the unfolding of diverse possible worlds and 
subjectivities, including researchers and researched entities (Despret, 2004; Latour, 2004). 
From this stems a singular characteristic of ANT and PE regarding the multiplicity of 
scientific knowledge. Most epistemological approaches identify multiplicity as a sign of a 
pre-scientific state, while the presence of a unified project and its rationality (Canguilhem, 
1966) or a paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) is a sign of scientific activity. In ANT and PE, in contrast, 
multiplicity is considered more positively. Referring especially to PE, Latour (2004, p. 220) 
points out this positive approach: ‘Generalization should be a vehicle for travelling through 
as many differences as possible – thus maximizing articulations – and not a way of 
decreasing the number of alternative versions of the same phenomena’. This completely 
inverts certain critiques of the scientific status of human sciences, such as the one made by 
Canguilhem (1966) in regard to psychology. 
Similarly, Mol (2002) and Law (2004) take multiplicity as a positive aspect of many 
scientific and technical devices in their concept of ontological politics. For these authors, 
more than being a representation of a pre-existing reality from the point of view of different 
perspectives, scientific practices produce distinct (multiple) worlds, without any ultimate 
unity (singularity), but are also not entirely inarticulate (plurality). Here, the term 
‘multiplicity’ is specified: it is not an anomaly in a unique and singular world, as in the 
perspective of Euro-American metaphysics1 (Law, 2004, p. 25), and neither does it point to 
a plurality of events without connections: ‘We are in a world where bodies, or organizations, 
or machines are more than one and less than many. In a world that is more than one and less 
than many. Somewhere in between’ (Law, 2004, p. 62). 
 
1 John Law (2004, pp. 24–26) considers Euro-American metaphysics as the common assumptions of the 
major modes of scientific knowledge, such as the precedence and independence of the reality to be 
represented, besides its definability, singularity and universality. 
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An example of this performed multiplicity can be found in Mol’s study (2002) of 
arteriosclerosis, which is not seen as a pathological state inherent to the body that is 
represented in different perspectives (in the laboratory or in clinical exams). Instead, each 
one of these scientific practices enacts a mode of arteriosclerosis, a pathological reality that 
does not necessarily converge, but that is also not entirely disjointed. Mol uses the term 
political ontologies, since each scientific practice constructs a particular reality among other 
possible ones. This, in an interplay with other scientific practices, constitutes a multiverse: 
more than one and less than many. 
Clinical devices and the ways in which subjectivities are 
produced 
How can we conduct research on the ways in which subjectivity is produced in diverse 
technoscientific networks? First, we need to consider the remarkable diversity of political 
ontologies which are present in the great number of scientific devices and expressed in their 
multiple capacities of fabricating subjects or ‘artificial selves’ (Latour, 1998b). As we have 
seen before, this productive aspect of subjectivities is not considered by ANT or PE as a 
parasitic remnant, but as an actual aspect of the production of knowledge. The problem of 
certain scientific devices (such as those used in most psychological research) is that they 
very frequently present a mode of knowing based on the extortion of their witnesses 
(Stengers, 1989), not only in the way the tasks are demanded to be undertaken, but 
especially in how these observers are positioned, such that they rarely introduce problems 
or questioning. Here, Latour, Stengers and Despret all highlight the relative obedience and 
docility of human beings towards scientific authority: 
 
Contrary to non-humans, humans have a great tendency, when faced with scientific authority, to 
abandon any recalcitrance and to behave like obedient objects, offering the investigators only 
redundant statements, thus comforting those same investigators in the belief that they have 
produced robust ‘scientific’ facts and imitated the great solidity of the natural sciences! (Latour, 
2004, p. 217) 
 
For Latour (1997, p. 301), the human sciences (psychotherapies included) would only really 
become sciences if they imitated not the objectivity of the natural sciences, but the 
possibility of recalcitrance. In other words, we can say that their major problem is not their 
capacity to influence and produce subjects, but to extort and create docility, inhibiting the 
possibilities of recalcitrance. In this way, while seeking the ‘objectivity of the natural 
sciences’, the human sciences frequently extort their research subjects, thus producing 
standardized subjectivities. This position stands in stark contrast to the perspective of 
thinkers such as Herbert Marcuse (1991), for whom the possibility of denial or resistance is 
a characteristic mark of human beings. 
Regarding the clinical practices, Stengers states that if psychoanalysis can invent a device 
that enables subjects to use free discourse (Stengers, 1989), or even a laboratory for the 
production of controlled transference (Stengers, 1992), it prevents the risk through a 
transcendental reasoning on the concept of the unconscious (Stengers, 1989) and on the 
asymmetric placement of the problem of influence beyond its boundaries (Stengers, 1992). 
For this author, psychoanalysis is only subject to risk and recalcitrance when hypnosis and 
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influence (which were removed in the definition of its boundaries) are taken again into 
account. 
In short, how does this concept of knowledge beyond epistemology explain the production 
of subjectivity in psychology? 
1) By stating that the production of a subjectivity (see Latour, 1996, 2004, 2005) goes 
beyond being an accident or an undesired effect of the process of “the unveiling of our true 
subjectivity”, and rather marks this coarticulation itself among the agents involved in the 
process of the creation of knowledge. 
2) When it examines the topic of influence not only through the criticism of its exclusion 
from the clinical domain (Stengers, 1989, 1992), but in a more positive way through 
Nathan’s approach (1996). Here the meaning of therapy is related to that which Latour 
(1998) calls the production of “artificial selves”. 
3) In accepting that the production of a subjectivity is a crucial part of the scientific and the 
clinical processes, and that these can no longer be evaluated in terms of objectivity or 
detachment from the practices of everyday life, but in terms of recalcitrance or docility. 
How can we apply this distinction in our field? 
Despret (2004) asserts that the possibility of recalcitrance in psychological testimonies, 
which is quite rare, is even more difficult to achieve due to devices that place participants 
in a “naive” position, not knowing what the objective of the research is. Subjects without 
the excellence of expertise do not pose a risk of taking up a position in the investigations (p. 
97). Current psychological laboratories are based on this arrangement. And we could also 
add many clinical devices that have been made impregnable by the position of scientific 
authority of the researcher and by certain concepts such as resistance, where the statement 
of truth is a task reserved only to the analyst, even when the individual that is being analyzed 
disagrees. In this case, the patient’s refusal only points to a stronger confirmation of the 
analyst’s interpretation, with no possibility of jeopardizing the clinical device. 
This mechanism of docility in the clinical field (created by the authority of the therapist) is 
reinforced by the policy of dual-secrecy highlighted by Despret (2011a). First, by 
transforming everything that might generate a symptom in the patient into a private secret. 
Secondly, the therapist’s intervention is executed in the same confidential manner, thus 
establishing this secrecy as a crucial aspect of his or her professional competence. Here it is 
worth investigating what this dual segregating mechanism produces. For this Despret makes 
use of the etymological origin of the word “secret” as the past participle (secretus) of the 
Latin verb scenere (to separate). Thus, these practices of secrecy are equally “secreting” and 
“segregating”, separating the private domain from the public through a subjective construct. 
It is in the private domain where one produces the intimate truth of the disease that can be 
treated only through secrecy by the therapists. 
One consequence of this secreting/segregating policy of intimate truths is “the unnamed 
effect” that transforms the patient’s discourse into an anonymous authorship in the reporting 
of their cases. This anonymity is initially justified as a way of protecting patients, 
safeguarding (and certainly producing) their intimate sphere. But one might as well 
understand this protection as being not only for the patients but also for the therapists, 
safeguarding them from a public domain that is open to criticism. However, this anonymity 
contrasts with the authorship of the therapists and indicates a clear asymmetry in the field 
of the production of knowledge, in a similar way as the “naive subject” device in the 
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laboratory. The investigated subject in the laboratory and the patient undergoing therapy at 
the clinic are assigned predetermined spaces: for the first, that of exact responses, and for 
the second, that of symptoms and intimate secrets. Both are anonymous in a production of 
knowledge driven (and almost monopolized) by the psi professional, whether he or she is a 
researcher or a therapist. 
Is there a possible alternative to the interaction of these “micro-powers”? Despret (2004, p. 
102) indicates a possibility for psychological devices: these can be “the place of exploration 
and creation of what humans can be capable of when one deals with them with the 
confidence that one reserves for experts”. In other words, it involves a psychology that no 
longer seeks the monochord testimony of a universal law in a secret or in the reactions of 
the subjects to predetermined conditions, but that seeks ever newer versions of the ways in 
which we can create ourselves as subjects through the performance of the researched 
subjects. This approach does not contain any previous naturalizing principle to evaluate the 
daily affairs and transcendental foundations of our existence, for any principle can only be 
defined in the different and multiple articulations of our versions (including those of our 
everyday lives). 
Lost in a labyrinth: walking through a division of applied 
psychology 
Rather than continuing this critical analysis of the clinical practices, we would like to draw 
attention to the micropolitical effects of research and clinical practices. The production of 
worlds or subjectivities involves great political risks. More specifically, we will dwell on a 
research programme that our group has been developing at the Division of Applied 
Psychology (DAP) of the Institute of Psychology of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
(UFRJ), in order to observe the diverse ways in which certain psychological guidelines 
entail distinct ways in which subjectivities are produced (Ferreira et al., 2013; Ferreira, 
Pereira, & Foureaux, 2014). As we presented in the beginning of the text, the DAP offers 
psychotherapeutic services that follow different approaches (psychoanalysis, cognitive      
behavioural therapy (CBT), Gestalt therapy, schizoanalysis and existential analysis, among 
others) to the community as a low-cost (or even free) service, employing student interns as 
therapists, who are supervised by a professor or a psychologist of the Institute of 
Psychology. Our research is undertaken through interviews and field observations of the 
participants’ actions (patients, interns, and supervisors) when they are put in contact with 
different psychological services, tracing the many ways in which these subjects are formed 
through different kinds of articulations. Our research makes use of some parameters of the 
ANT and PE: the participants are taken as experts on the topic, without any division between 
common and scientific knowledge; and, since they are considered experts, we ask them to 
describe their practices and experiences, as well as the clinical processes. In other words, 
we follow the actors and their descriptions of their actions. 
We have been observing supervision sessions (where the clinical cases are discussed by 
supervisors and interns)2 through an ethnographic approach (Caiafa, 2007), and have been 
interviewing patients, interns and professors-supervisors in clinical services of different 
 
2 Supervision sessions are weekly meetings between supervisors and interns with the aim of discussing      
the cases worked on      by the latter. Their function is not only to improve their approach toward      the 
cases, but mainly to train the students in clinical practices. 
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approaches (psychoanalysis, CBT, Gestalt therapy, institutional analysis and existential 
analysis). We also inspect further actors in this scenario, such as the architecture of the 
building, the laws that regulate internships, the rooms where the sessions are held, and so 
on. A base questionnaire works as a general script (see the Appendix), with an open space 
for the hints and indications of the participants. In order to prevent the questions from being 
seen as a test of knowledge, we often ask the participants to share their thoughts about what 
they consider to be the best research topic for a group studying the DAP (as proposed by 
Despret, 2011b). In this way, we expect that the participants can assume a position of 
expertise that can favour a more recalcitrant effect. One of the objectives we are pursuing 
with this research project is to understand how the negotiation of meanings between such 
different lines of thought with different parameters can happen in this common space. 
Latour (1999), when speaking about the creation of scientific concepts, coined the concept 
of ‘immutable mobiles’, which allow ‘new translations and articulations, while keeping 
some forms of relationships intact’. Generally in psychological technical devices, we point 
out that, unlike other sciences and techniques, there are several ‘mutable immobiles’ 
(Ferreira et al., 2013); they are immobile because they are restricted to a certain approach, 
and mutable thanks to their potency in producing different subjectivities in connection with 
their socio-technical arrangement. In other words, there is the rare possibility of articulation 
between different psychological approaches in the DAP, which leads us to suspect that this 
set of practices is much better characterized by plurality than by multiplicity in Law’s (2004) 
terms. 
We have searched for a point in which these aspects connect and articulate: conceptual 
articulations, the sharing of experiences between interns, and even the circulation of patients 
between different teams of different perspectives. What we observed is that there is no form 
of contact that can guarantee even the slightest articulation as multiplicity: the interns are 
not allowed to discuss the cases during the reception of patients in the triage room and, even 
though the various teams are open to the circulation of patients from team to team (as they 
declare in the interviews), this rarely occurs (according to those same interviews). How does 
this state of plurality engender processes that produce subjectivity? We can investigate this 
both from the perspectives of the interns and of the patients. 
On the intern-therapist’s side, much of their education consists in the constant criticism of 
other approaches; it is almost as if a part of the pedagogy of becoming a psychologist of a 
certain approach is to accept its share of criticism against the other approaches. This is in 
line with Foucault’s (1994) claim that psychology grows by denouncing the myths of others 
approaches (concerning the duration and focus of therapies, as well as the concepts of the 
different approaches). An interesting effect of subjectivation (Ferreira et al., 2013) takes 
place when an intern inhabits more than one approach: for instance, there was an intern 
working in a psychoanalysis team who reported having worked in a CBT research group. 
Even if she wasn’t constrained in a more problematic way, she reported a series of daily 
acts of prejudice, involving stereotyped views of both approaches: of CBT as a practice of 
self-help and of psychoanalysis as linked to questions of sexuality or to severe 
abnormalities. She even reported being questioned for having both of those experiences on 
her CV. This leads us to the conclusion that the obstacles to the circulation and composition 
of a common world across different psychological approaches can be radical to the point of 
it being impossible for them to inhabit the same professional career or the same body. A 
process like one of purging (of the former practices) and of conversion (to the new ones) 
would seem to be necessary. 
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This question of plurality does not affect the patients when it comes to defining an identity: 
the association with a group that manages a specific therapeutic practice isn’t an issue for 
them. Likewise, their processes of subjectivation are not limited to transformations in the 
therapeutic practices: patients link therapy to very diverse practices in very active ways. We 
can define patients in various ways, but not as passive and patient creatures. When analyzing 
the interviews, rather than classifying the practices of a given approach as either extortive 
or as favouring recalcitrance, we found a series of clues in the uses that patients made of the 
therapies that pointed to specific techniques of the self (see Ferreira et al, 2014). These 
manifested in attitudes of problematization of the self and instances of collective life – such 
as prejudice, stereotypes and subliminal messages – which led to rather peculiar exercises, 
such as the creation of diaries and the appropriation of therapist’s discourses. 
Rather than simply classifying the clinical practices as producing docility or as open to 
recalcitrance, we tried to use those concepts to assess the openness that research itself can 
achieve in relation to recalcitrant discourses, acting on the modes of the production of 
subjectivity. In this sense, reflection on our practices should be constant. Here, it was our 
intention that the practice of becoming unfamiliar with ourselves should involve both the 
act of researching itself and the revision of concepts (such as the boundary between docility 
and recalcitrance). Thus, we could ask ourselves how mutually exclusive recalcitrance and 
docility really are, if we take into account the modes of articulation. 
A short conclusion 
This chapter/article offers a way of exploring in an ANT and PE fashion the multiverse of 
a Division of Applied Psychology. In the most controversial sense, we can define it as a 
Babel tower of psychotherapeutic tendencies and a kind of cyclotron laboratory that 
produces subjectivities. In this regard, we think that more than considering psychology 
unified, multiple or plural, it is crucial to concretely examine its lines of continuity and 
rupture. This is the greatest difference between these kinds of analyses and the 
epistemological ones (e.g. Canguilhem, 1966 or Lagache, 1949): these last works try to 
discuss and establish the entire nature of psychological knowledge a priori, without any 
attention to specific practices. Another difference between epistemological and ANT/PE 
perspectives is the tendency to believe in a purified (or not) perspective of the clinical field 
and the subjective process. As we could see, Freud (1969) establishes the difference between 
a legitimate and an illegitimate approach toward therapies as the comparison of two artistic 
styles: if true therapies work as sculptors, revealing true subjectivities, false therapies work 
as painters, adding false components to the realm of subjectivities. In the epistemological 
perspective, the production of subjectivity is an illegitimate process; it only exists the 
revealing of true subjectivities mediated by true therapies. 
Through this research we were able to begin describing the DAP using ANT’s and PE’s 
perspectives; nonetheless, this description can be improved by adding other important 
questions: 1) Is this expert position the only requirement for an investigation to be 
characterized by recalcitrance? 2) Is there a total coincidence between the expert/naive and 
recalcitrant/docile positions? Is there no possibility for a less dualist typology that includes 
other intermediate cases? Concerning both questions, it is necessary to emphasize that the 
expert position cannot be an isolated criterion for recalcitrance. This question is a 
consequence of actual results of an investigation into the psychological modes of 
subjectivation with high school students in Rio de Janeiro (Ferreira et al., 2011): the 
distinction between groups submitted to “expert” (knowing the objectives of the 
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investigation) and “naive” (not knowing the objectives of the investigation) devices did not 
produce very different results. The same occurred in the present investigation performed 
with patients of psychoanalytic, cognitive behavioral, gestaltist and schizoanalytic therapies 
in the Division of Applied Psychology of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Ferreira 
et al., 2013, 2014): the invitation to take up an expert position does not necessarily imply 
leaving a naive position. Even with all the efforts to co-divide the role of expert, the 
interviewed patients could still see themselves confronted with a strong component of 
“authority” in the psychologist-investigator, which could lead to a situation in which the 
interviewed patient assumed that the interview was a “test of psi knowledge” about their 
own experiences. Once the role of knowing more than the interviewed psychologists is 
attributed to the psychologist-investigator, the psychologists generally offer very canonical 
answers (that do not differ greatly from the traditional handbooks) about the psychologies 
and the therapeutic processes. Concerning these aspects, we can indicate that recalcitrance 
and docility are not absolute criteria, but can be considered to be on a spectrum and are not 
exclusively defined by expertise (or lack thereof). Circumstantial aspects of the research 
design are crucial in the definition of the degree of recalcitrance. 
And last but not the least, it is very important to emphasize that this approach combining 
the perspectives of ANT and PE in the production of subjectivity is strongly promoted by 
researchers of Ibero-American countries (Ferreira & Carrasco, 2016). This approach can, 
from a southern perspective (Santos, 2014), foster new perspectives for studying the 
production of subjectivities, similar to what ANT did for research into the modes of 
production of realities. In our view only the polyphony of this field is able to expand our 
versions of subjectivity and psychotherapies as in the works of Tobie Nathan (1995, 1996), 
by proposing therapies with a very different ontology and epistemology. 
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For this we prepared four distinct interview scripts: 
1) Patients in the therapeutic process at DAP/UFRJ; 
2) For interns of the stages at DAP/UFRJ; 
3) For internship supervisors at DAP/UFRJ; 
5) For interns responsible for the screening at DAP/UFRJ; 
 
Here are the specific scripts: 
1) For patients in the therapeutic process at DAP/UFRJ; 
a) Suppose you were in our place as researchers on the presence of psychotherapy in people's 
lives (especially in DAP), what would you find interesting to ask? 
b) How would you answer this question?  
c) What are your main experiences when you entered the DAP space? 
d) What do you think has changed during this treatment? 
e) What act, gesture or therapy procedure do you consider the most important in treatment? 
f) Do you think that the psychological treatment is best suited for the reason that brought 
you here? 
g) What do you know of the approach (line/school/guidance) with which you are being 
treated? Do you know other approaches? 
h) In what ways do you think that psychology can help someone? 
i) What is psychological therapy in your point of view? 
j) What is psychology in your point of view? 
l) Has anything changed in your vision of psychology? 
 
2) For interns of DAP/UFRJ services: 
a) Suppose you were in our place as researchers on the presence of psychology in people's 
lives (especially in DAP), what would you find interesting to ask? 
b) How would you answer this question? 
c) What are your main experiences when you entered the DAP space? 
d) How would you describe the moment of first meeting with the patient? Is it necessary to 
explain to him or her what will happen during the sessions? 
e) What act, gesture or therapy procedure do you consider the most important in a treatment? 
f) What do you think changes in patients' lives after the intervention of their training group? 
g) Do you think the line you train in is the most appropriate for most of the demands present 
in the DAP? 
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h) How do you see the relationship of your line of intervention with the other lines of 
psychological treatment? 
i) Would you forward a client of yours to another treatment line? 
j) In which cases would this referral be appropriate in your opinion? 
l) Do you find it difficult to integrate theory and clinical practice? 
m) How do treated people think and understand psychology and therapy? 
n) How does this influence or interfere with the therapy? 
o) What is your vision of healing in psychological treatment? 
p) What is psychological therapy in your point of view? 
q) What is psychology in your point of view? 
 
3) To internship coordinators at DAP/UFRJ: 
a) Suppose you were in our place as researchers on the presence of psychology in people's 
lives (especially in DAP), what would you find interesting to ask? 
b) How would you answer this question? 
c) What are your main experiences when you entered the DAP space? 
d) What are your first instructions to the interns? 
e) What act, gesture or therapy procedure do you consider the most important in a treatment? 
f) What do you think changes in patients' lives after the intervention of their training group? 
g) Do you think the line of your training is the most appropriate for most of the demands 
present in the DAP? 
h) How do you see the relationship of your line of intervention with the other lines of 
psychological treatment? 
i) How do treated people think and understand psychology and therapy? 
j) How does this influence or interfere with the therapy? 
l) What is your vision of healing in psychological treatment? 
m) What is psychological therapy in your point of view? 
n) What is psychology in your point of view? 
 
4) Script for trainee screening personnel at DAP/UFRJ: 
a) Suppose you were in our place as researchers on the presence of psychology in people's 
lives (especially in DAP), what would you find interesting to ask? 
b) How would you answer this question? 
c) What are your main experiences when you entered the DAP space? 
d) Do you see that certain cases are referred to certain treatments during screening? 
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e) What is your mode of referring the patients when they come for screening? 
f) Would you propose another way to refer to them? 
g) How would you describe the moment of the first meeting with the patient? Is it necessary 
to clarify something about the treatment? 
h) What is your vision of healing in psychological treatment? 
i) What is psychological therapy in your point of view? 
j) What is psychology in your point of view? 
 
The participants of this research project are recruited differently. The interns and the intern 
coordinator are contacted in the meeting with the training staff. The patients who entered 
into the intern treatment are being contacted by the teams themselves. Considering the 
participants as experts on the topic of the research, all data obtained by interviews is being 
considered, except for those in which participants refuse to have their data used by the 
research (according to an informed consent agreement that will be provided). 
